Introduction
Credit risk is one of the primary risks facing banks and other creditors. One way for lenders to hedge credit risk is to require financial guarantees for the loans they make.
A financial guarantee is a promise from a third party to make good on payments to the fund provider when the borrower defaults. To have access to funds at lower costs, firms use financial guarantees to improve their credit rating and debt capacity. Although financial guarantees have been mainly provided by government agencies, the current trend is toward increases in private financial guarantees backed by banks, insurance companies, and international organizations such as the World Bank. These guarantee providers are not default-free or by any standards, not of full faith and full credit. Merton (1977) is the first to establish an isomorphism between a put option and a financial guarantee. A financial guarantee is a put option written by the guarantor and granted to the bondholder. 1 The so-called structural models have been used to value financial insurance in most studies on public or default-free loan guarantees. Extending works on options with default risk (e.g., Johnson and Stulz (1987) , Klein and Inglis (1999, 2001) ), some authors have studied private financial guarantees provided by a vulnerable guarantor (i.e., the guarantor is subject to default risk), e.g., Chen, Hung, and Mazumdar (1994) , , Soumaré (2002, 2003) , Lai (1992 Lai ( , 1995 , Lai and Gendron (1994) , and Lai and Yu (1999) .
However, almost all previous works assume exogenous risks for the projects being guaranteed and fail to account for agency and incentive problems inherent in financial contracting. There are several studies on the endogenization of bank risks under deposit insurance, see for instance, Gennotte and Pyle (1991) , Ritchken, Thomson, and DeGennaro (1993) , and Park (1997) . Although these authors endogenize risk taking in 1 The structural approach to the analysis of credit risk requires the assumption of a stochastic process for the value of the firm's total assets. Bankruptcy is triggered when the value of the firm's total assets falls below a predefined fixed amount at or before maturity, e.g., Merton (1974) , Black and Cox (1976) . Many authors have extended further earlier models of Shimko, Tejima, and Van Deventer (1993) , Kim, Ramaswamy, and Sundaresan (1993) , and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) .
the context of a one-agent game, none has endogenized risk choices explicitly in the presence of a guarantor with finite wealth and risk by means of a two-agent (the firm and the guarantor) game. Furthermore, in these studies, the government, which provides deposit insurance, is assumed to have no risk and infinite wealth, i.e., default-free and non vulnerable. Merton and Bodie (1992) discuss the conflicts of interest between the parties involved in the guarantee contract and underscore the mitigating role of monitoring. In general, the guarantor would like to keep the risk of his insured client low, whereas the client firm would like to do the opposite. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that to maximize their expected profits, the parties will choose endogenously their risk levels. To tackle these conflicting objectives simultaneously, we propose an equilibrium loan guarantee model in which the two parties in question contract on the risk level of the project to be funded in part by guaranteed debt.
It has been long recognized that there are conflicts of interest between the firms and their creditors (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Myers (1977) , and Leland (1998) among others). By choosing the risk level of its assets to increase its shareholders' value (Jensen and Meckling (1976) ), the firm exacerbates the debt overhang problem of Myers (1977) . Galai and Masulis (1976) , Leland (1998) and others find that the firm's value to equity holders is increasing with the risk level of the firm's total assets. Marcus (1984) , Furlong and Keeley (1989) , and Keeley and Furlong (1990) , among numerous other authors, find similar results in the banking literature. However, we push further into the modelling of the linkage between the borrowing firm, (thereafter, "the firm"), and the vulnerable guarantee provider and study their risk-taking incentives and capital structure choices. In effect, we introduce an intermediate player in the game which is the guarantor.
To study the optimal levels of risk taken by the borrowing firm and the guarantor, we propose two approaches using a standard contingent-claims analysis framework. In the first approach, we assume that both contracting parties choose their assets' risk level à la Jensen and Meckling (1976) , i.e., they choose the level of risk that maximizes the residual value to their shareholders. The level of risk the firm takes affects not only, the residual value to its shareholders, but also the guarantor's equity holders' net wealth. If the firm chooses a risky technology, its default probability increases and affects negatively the guarantor's net wealth. Therefore, the guarantor has to monitor the firm and participate directly in the choice of the borrowing firm's risk posture. Thus, in the second approach, we use a Pareto equilibrium optimality criterion to obtain the optimal risk levels for both parties. In this latter approach, right at the outset, the two parties contract on the risk levels, and no one deviates from the optimal choice after the guarantee contract is signed. While the first approach assumes unilateral decisions by both parties, the second approach supposes best negotiations between the two sides in picking their risk technologies.
We also adopt the concept of "charter value" used extensively in the banking literature, e.g., Marcus (1984) , Keeley (1990) , Wilson (1994, 1999) .
However, unlike Marcus (1984) , who assumes the "charter value" constant, we posit this latent value which captures knowledge capital and growth options that the firm loses in bankruptcy, as a quadratic function of the risk level. This modeling feature itself is an innovation of the paper.
The main results are as follows. First, when the firm chooses unilaterally the risk technology for its project's assets, its incentive to take higher risks is driven entirely by its capital structure. In line with the results in the extant literature, the more the firm is indebted (with guaranteed debt), the more it is inclined to choose a high risk technology.
Given the asymmetrical payoff of equity (a call option), by having a large amount of debt, the shareholders' value increases with the risk level of the assets. The presence of financial guarantees exacerbates this risk-taking behavior. 2 Meanwhile, when the guarantor chooses unilaterally its own assets' risk level, the risk it is willing to bear depends not only on its own capital structure, but also on the characteristics of the project it is guaranteeing. Like the firm, the guarantor takes more risk when it has a substantial senior debt. It will take less risk when the insured firm is more likely to default on its loan. Since the borrowing firm transfers part of its higher risk to the guarantor, to honor its insurance obligations, the guarantor has to operate at sustainable risk levels, i.e., the insurer adjusts its risk posture in function of its client's risk profile.
2 By monitoring, the guarantee provider lessens the risk appetite of the borrowing firm; nevertheless, it bears essentially most of the risk.
Second, by taking part in the risk choices, the guarantor entices the firm to take lower levels of risk than those taken unilaterally by the firm, otherwise. Even though the conflict of interest here is between the borrowing firm's shareholders and the guarantor rather than between shareholders and debt holders, these results are consistent with previous findings in studies on agency conflicts. Indeed, when it is heavily indebted, the firm exhibits a greater appetite for risk, which increases the guarantor vulnerability. The firm's risk choice is also affected by the maturity of the guaranteed loan. When it has less debt with very short maturity, the firm prefers a high risk technology. Nevertheless, for longer maturity loans, the equibrium risk follows the same pattern as the one for optimal risk when the firm decides unilaterally. Furthermore, the more the borrowing firm is indebted, the higher is the equilibrium risk.
Finally, we study the trade-off between the firm's optimal capital structure and its risk-taking incentives. By imposing a constant target debt ratio, we determine simultaneously the portion of the investment financed by internal funds and the risk level of the project. We show that the target capital structure (leverage) of the firm is the main driver of its risk choices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 spells out the model's assumptions and the payoffs to all parties involved. Section 3 discusses the unilateral risk choices by the firm and the guarantor. Section 4 presents and discusses our equilibrium framework for the determination of the project optimal risk. Section 5 discusses the tradeoff between the risk level and the capital structure of the firm. Section 6 concludes.
Model set-up and assumptions
We start with an all-equity financed firm, "the firm", with asset value V 0 hold entirely by its shareholders. The total initial debt value is zero. 3 For simplicity, we assume the shareholders to be in charge of the company (i.e., they are "the manager").
Therefore, we rule out the agency conflicts between the manager and shareholders. At the initial date t=0, there is a new project requiring an initial investment I. We assume that V 0 is less than I, thus the firm needs outside financing to undertake the new project. The firm finances part of the investment by guaranteed loan and the remainder by recapitalization.
In other words, the shareholders decide to increase their capital by αI and borrow (1-α)I
to finance the new project. We assume that αI is entirely financed by the existing shareholders, meaning that no new shares are issued or there are no new shareholders in our model.
We assume that multiple risk technologies are available for executing the new project. The debt is guaranteed by a guarantor, which has a senior debt with face value D W . The initial asset value of the guarantor is W 0 . The guarantor is vulnerable, i.e., it can default on the payment of the guaranteed loan. By offering the guarantee, the guarantor is increasing its default risk level. To reduce its own post-guarantee default probability, the guarantor has to participate directly or indirectly in the choice of the risk technology of the project and monitor the management of the project. The guarantor has also at hand the choice of its own risk technology.
We make the standard assumptions of contingent-claims analysis (i.e., perfect, frictionless markets in which securities are traded in continuous time, with no tax, no transaction and bankruptcy costs, and no asymmetric information, etc.). 4 There are no dividend payments nor intermediate payments on the debt before it matures. The firm and the guarantor's assets follow geometric Brownian motion:
where corr(dZ W , dZ V )=ρdt is the nonstochastic correlation between the two assets' returns; µ V and σ V are respectively the instantaneous constant return and volatility of the project's assets; µ W and σ W are respectively the instantaneous constant return and volatility of the 4 See Merton (1974) for the complete standard contingent-claims analysis assumptions, Crouhy and Galai (1991) for an application in banking, and Stulz and Johnson (1985) for an analysis of secured debt.
guarantor's assets; Z W and Z V are standard Wiener processes.
Payoffs to the firm's shareholders
The new investment I increases the initial value of the firm's assets by ξI where ξ is a profitability index of the investment determined by the market (as in Sosin (1980) , Selby, Franks, and Karki (1988) ). The post-new investment firm value is V p0 = V 0 +ξI. By fixing ξ and I exogenously, we assume a perfect correlation between the existing project and the new project cash flows, thereby neglecting diversification or self insurance effects. We justify this by assuming either that these projects use the same technology or the new project is in the same industry or business line as the old one (e.g., expansion of the old project).
We also have I=E a +D V , where E a is the internal fund brought by existing shareholders (recapitalization) and is equal to αI, and D V is the nominal value of the debt and equal to (1-α)I. At the debt maturity date T which is coincident with the life of the project, the total value of the firm V T is shared by debt holders and equity holders as follows: V T = E VT +FD V , where FD V is the face value of the debt at the maturity date T.
The face value of the debt at maturity and the nominal value at time zero are linked by the following relationship:
where R is the cost (or yield to creditors expressed in percentage) paid by the firm for each dollar borrowed with guarantee. 6 Since the guarantor is vulnerable, i.e., it can fail to indemnify the lender in case of default by the borrower, the guaranteed debt's default risk premium is not nil. The borrowing rate R, different from the risk-free rate r, may be determined by the approach proposed by Merton (1974) . 7 However, to simplify our 5 We assume no intermediate payments on the debt, thus bankruptcy occurs only at the maturity of the debt. 6 In the context of deposit insurance, Kendall and Levonian (1991) and Kendall (1992) deduct the constant premium assumed paid at the beginning of the period.
7 Merton (1974) proposes a risk premium expression for a risky debt as follows:
is the quasi-debt ratio, F the face value of the numerical computations, we choose R as a linear function of the firm's and the guarantor's risks measured by their asset volatilities:
Consistent with Merton (1974) , R is an increasing function of σ V , i.e., the risk premium increases with the firm's assets risk level, hence λ is positive. 9 The sign of the coefficient δ depends on the impact of the guarantor's risk as discussed in Lai and Yu (1999) .
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Using Equation (3) and the linear formulation of R (Equation (4)), the face value of the guaranteed debt becomes
The net-asset value of the firm at the terminal date T is given by:
where C V is the firm's "charter value" as introduced by Marcus (1984) . We group under the "charter value", the latent value of human capital, knowledge capital, skills and experience, client relationships, networks, growth options, etc., that the firm loses in debt, N 1 (.) is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution, and
When the guarantor is not vulnerable (for example, the government), the guaranteed debt is risk-free, thus the risk premium is nil (the borrowing rate is exactly equal to the risk-free rate of the economy r). 9 Asymmetric information can affect the guarantee premium setting. Since the insurer does not know the exact level of risk of the firm, there is moral hazard. Absent of effective monitoring, the firm's risk appetite, if unchecked, will harm the guarantor. As discussed later, with the type of contract we propose, the guarantor mitigates this moral hazard by selecting the insured firm risk posture in conjunction with his client. Therefore, asymmetric information manifests itself in the guarantee premium, and is one reason why the firm seeks a guarantee, otherwise, it is indifferent with regard to credit enhancement.
10 From the results in Lai and Yu (1999), δ can be either negative or positive. Indeed, they show that the risk level of the guarantor's assets can have a negative or positive impact on the guarantee premium depending on the sign of the correlation between the firm's asset returns and the guarantor's asset returns. When V and W are positively correlated, the firm and the guarantor's volatilities move in the same direction, hence affect positively the risk premium, whereas for a negative correlation between the two assets' returns, a high risk for the firm should be combined with a low risk for the guarantor and vice versa. In this case, the risk premium decreases and δ can then be negative. To study its impact on our numerical results, we will specify exogenously different values for δ.
bankruptcy. This "bonus" reward can only be realized at T and is distinct from the value of the growth options "in place" already reflected in V T .
There is no extant research to assist us in specifying an "exact" functional form for the "charter value" especially for non-financial institutions. 11 Contrary to Marcus (1984), we assume that C V is not constant. Furthermore, we posit it as a function of the terminal total asset value and risk level of the firm. In effect, we assume the "charter value" to be a variable proportion of total assets of the firm at time T. Keeley (1990) finds a negative relationship between the risk level and the "charter value" whereas Park (1997) shows a positive relationship. Since there is no widely accepted formulation, and given the fact that the "charter value" is affected not only by the size of the firm but also by the level of risk taken by the firm today, we model the "charter value" as follows:
where the coefficients a, b and c are such that θ V is bounded by two values less than unity. We also assume that a>0, b>0 and c<0. From this formulation, the rate θ V has a humped shape, i.e., it increases first with the risk level of the firm up to a threshold limit and decreases afterwards. This characterization is based on the fact that the risk has two sides: on one hand, a low risk level can compromise the future growth of the firm, on the other hand, a high level of risk increases the default probability. Hence, up to a tolerable maximum risk level, when the firm increases its risk level, it gains from future growth opportunities. Beyond this risk level, if the firm continues to increase its risk level, it jeopardizes its future growth potential and destroys value. This modeling feature combines the results in Keeley (1990) and Park (1997) and introduces bonus and penalty mechanisms to restrain the firm risk-taking incentives. In other words, we inject selfdiscipline via the "charter value" to police excessive risk taking.
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Shareholders' wealth is now the value of a call option on the firm's total asset value with exercise price equal to the debt face value, plus an additional term C V in case the firm doesn't default. Taking into account the "charter value" given above (Equation (6)) and denoting 1 {.} as an indicator variable evaluating with respect to the realization set {.}, we express the payoff to the firm's shareholders at time T as
To obtain quasi-closed form solutions, we use the equivalent martingale approach via the risk-neutral expectation operator E * [.] . The equity value to the firm's shareholders is the present value under the risk-neutral probability measure of the terminal payoff:
After some algebraic manipulations presented in the Appendix, the value to the firm's shareholders is:
where ( )
and N 1 (.) is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. Equation (7) is akin to the Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) formulas for a call option, except for the parameter θ V capturing the "charter value". The first term of the right hand side of Equation (7) represents the present value of the expected asset cum charter value of the firm. The second term represents the present value of the face value of the firm's debt. Thus, the value to the firm's shareholders is the difference between the expected value of the firm's assets and its debt.
The firm's objective function is the total equity value minus the new capital infusion by the shareholders. 13 This constitutes a capital gain realized by shareholders on the new investment (or the expected net present value of the new investment):
Payoffs to the guarantor
At maturity T of the guaranteed debt, the guarantor pays first its senior debt assumed to mature at the same time, and provides guarantee if its client, the borrowing firm, defaults. The guarantor will default at T if its total asset value is less than the senior debt amount plus the residual debt amount to be paid to the insured firm's debt holders. 
Scenarios Payoffs
Case I:
E WT is the net-wealth to the guarantor. As for the borrowing firm, we account for the guarantor own "charter value" as:
where a', b', and c' are chosen such that θ W is bounded by two values less than unity, and a'>0, b'>0 and c'<0.
In Case I, neither the firm nor the guarantor defaults. In Case II, the firm defaults on the payment of its debt and the guarantor is able to cover the shortfall. In Case III, the firm defaults, and the guarantor, after payment of its senior debt, is unable to pay fully the shortfall to the firm's debt holders. In Case IV, the guarantor's total asset value is less than its senior debt face value, thus the guarantor cannot pay in full its senior debt. The residual payoff to the guarantor at maturity date T can be summarized as follows:
Again, using the risk-neutral probability measure and expectation operator E * [.] , the guarantor's equity value expressed as the expected present value of the terminal payoff is given as follows:
After some algebraic derivations presented in the Appendix, the guarantor's equity value is: 
where N 2 (.,.,ρ) is the cumulative density function of the standard bivariate normal distribution with correlation ρ and the expressions for
given in the Appendix.
Payoffs to the holders of the guaranteed loan
When the debt is guaranteed, its value at maturity is a function of the firm's asset value, the guarantor's asset value and its senior debt. The payoff to the firm's debt holders are given as follows:
At maturity, if the firm's asset value exceeds the face value of its debt, the firm is solvent. Hence, the firm reimburses its debt entirely. Otherwise, when the firm does default, several cases are possible. If the guarantor's asset value net of its senior debt payment is bigger than the remaining payment on the firm's debt, the debt is paid fully.
If the net asset of the guarantor is less than the residual payment on the debt, the debt is paid partially. In this case, the debt value to the firm's debt holders is equal to the firm's value plus the net asset of the guarantor.
The market value of the debt is the present value of the expected terminal payment on the guaranteed debt under the risk-neutral probability measure:
After some algebraic transformations, the present value of the firm's debt with guarantee is: 10 and d 11 are given in the Appendix.
In the following sections, to determine the optimal risk level of the project, we follow two approaches. The first approach supposes that the firm chooses the project risk technology unilaterally with no interference from the guarantor in its choice. The firm chooses the project risk level which maximizes its shareholders' expected net wealth. We do not analyze the impact of agency costs of debt on the borrowing firm's value but rather focus on the incentives of the firm induced by changes in the project risk. Taking the characteristics of the project as given, the guarantor chooses its own risk level to maximize its expected net wealth. The second approach employs an equilibrium set-up to obtain the optimal risk level for the project. We assume that, at the signature of the guarantee contract, the firm and the guarantor decide on the project risk level. This can be viewed as a form of monitoring put in place by the guarantor to reduce its default likelihood, which is a function of the guaranteed project characteristics. This may be viewed as a control mechanism suggested by Merton and Bodie (1992) for the management of viable financial guarantees businesses. Under this equilibrium framework, the monitoring is undertaken at the outset, at the signature of the contract, by means of a bargaining between the guarantor and the project's sponsor on the ex-ante risk technology. The choice is consensual, and thus satisfies a mutual agreement from both contracting parties.
Analysis of unilateral risk choices
In this section, we study the risk choices taken by each contracting party unilaterally. It consists of finding each firm's own level of risk which maximizes its shareholders' expected net wealth. We assume that the guarantor does not intrude in the risk choice decision of the firm. and c (c') which characterize the charter value C V (C W ) of the borrowing firm (the guarantor, respectively) modelled as
(see Equations (6) and (9)).
Firm's choice of the optimal risk level for its project
The firm's objective is to pick the risk technology which maximizes its shareholders' expected net wealth. In other words, the firm maximizes its shareholders' expected net wealth with respect to the risk level of its assets (e.g., Chesney and Gibson (1999) ). The maximization program is given as follows:
The first order condition for this optimization is 0
is given in the Appendix. 15 We cannot solve analytically for σ V but we can conduct numerical computations, which we do next to determine the existence of an interior solution. 
In other words, the optimization of the firm gives rise to an interior solution which is σ V * . Since the firm chooses the ex-ante optimal risk level σ V * which maximizes the net wealth of its shareholders, we have in fact established analytically the existence of a firm optimal risk posture. Insert Table 2 here
As shown in Table 2 , the optimal risk level chosen by the borrowing firm is a decreasing function of the initial value of its assets. Naturally, if the firm's shareholders have more equity stake in the firm, even if the debt is guaranteed, they will be less willing to choose higher levels of risk for the new project.
We perform our comparative statics analyses by plotting the results exhibited in Table   2 . Figure 2a shows an increase in the project risk level as the investment cost increases.
Intuitively, we expect the firm to take less risk when the project requires high initial investment because default on the project will be too costly. Surprisingly, this is not the case. If more investment were required to finance the project, all else being equal, the firm needs more guarantee to cover its debt. The firm's shareholders have relatively less equity stake in the firm; therefore, by taking more risk, they increase their net wealth.
The firm's optimal risk level increases with the maturity of the debt. This is similar to the time value of the option. In effect, the firm extracts more wealth by choosing a riskier technology for its project, thereby, benefits from the time value of the growth option (the "charter value") imbedded in the project. Figure 2b plots the risk level of the project as a function of the percentage of the new project's investment financed by internal funds. All else being equal, the risk level taken by the firm is decreasing with the degree of ownership of the firm. Consistent with basic intuition, if they put in more of their own money to finance the new project, the firm's shareholders have less desire to take on high-risk activities. Even with guaranteed debt, as higher risk increases its likelihood of bankruptcy, the firm will behave more cautiously.
Insert Figure 2 here
We also report in Table 2 the borrowing firm's optimal risk in the case without guarantee, i.e., the stand-alone firm case with its debt not guaranteed. 16 Results show that the levels of risk in this case are lower than those when the debt is insured. With no guarantor backing up its debt, since it cannot transfer risk to others, the firm will settle with a lower level of risk it solely can bear.
Guarantor's choice of its optimal risk level
Once the firm has selected its optimal risk level (σ V * ), we assume that the guarantor takes this risk level as given and chooses the optimal level of risk for its own assets. The guarantor then solves the following optimization problem:
The expression for E W0 is given by Equation (10). The first order condition for this
given in the Appendix. Unfortunately, we cannot solve analytically for the optimal risk level σ W * . To establish the existence of interior solution, we conduct numerical computations to gauge for the sign of with respect to the guarantor's asset volatility level σ W . These graphs show the existence of an interior solution to the guarantor's maximization problem.
Insert Figure 3 here
There exists an optimal risk level σ W * such that 0 ) ( To gauge for the variations, we change the values of some parameters keeping the others constant, ceteris paribus. The value changes are marked in bold.
Insert Table 3 here Table 3 shows that the optimal risk level of the guarantor increases with the borrowing firm's shareholders initial value and also with the percentage of internal funds brought by the firm's shareholders to finance the project. If the firm finances heavily the project with internal funds, the firm disciplines itself and reduces its risk taking.
Consequently, the guarantor, facing less riskiness from its client's project, increases its own asset risk level to maximize its net wealth.
Furthermore, when the firm chooses a high-risk technology, the guarantor decreases it own assets' risk level. These results are robust to changes in the correlation between the firm and the guarantor. However, high correlation values increase the guarantor's optimal risk level.
This analysis shows that the guarantor and the firm's choices of their respective asset risks are interrelated even if those were taken unilaterally. If the guarantor cannot influence the firm's choice of risk, at least it can adjust its own risk to decrease the overall default probability on the guaranteed debt. In other words, the guarantor decreases its own risk level if his client firm is expected to choose a high risk technology. On the other hand, if the borrowing firm is bound to choose low risk technologies, the guarantor increases its own risk. When the firm's exposure is of high risk, the guarantor reduces its risk level to decrease the default probability on the loan payment. The guarantor also chooses a low risk level if his client debt ratio is high. The results are robust to changes in the parameters values, especially the values of (a, b, c), (a', b', c') characterizing the "charter value" and also the sign of δ specifying the impact of the guarantor's risk posture on the loan default risk premium.
For a given level of σ V , the level of risk σ W obtained with δ positive is lower than the one with δ negative. Indeed, in Equation (4), R is expressed as a linear function of σ V and σ W , and then when the sensitivity coefficient of R to σ W is positive (δ>0), to reduce R, if σ V increases, σ W should decrease, and vice-versa. However, if the sensitivity coefficient of R to σ W is negative (δ<0), it is possible to observe both σ V and σ W increasing and it is consistent with the results in Lai and Yu (1999) .
Equilibrium analysis of optimal risk choices
We assume in the previous section that the firm chooses unilaterally its risk technology and the guarantor, taking as given this optimal risk level, chooses then its asset risk. In this set-up, the guarantor does not interfere with the firm's choice of risk technology. However, any level of risk chosen by the firm will have a brunt on the choice of the guarantor, which leads the guarantor to adjust its risk level accordingly.
Unfortunately, this approach does not give much room to the guarantor to maneuver and is inconsistent with the monitoring practice widely employed in the guarantee business.
To address these issues, we analyze the risk choices in an equilibrium setting. For this purpose, we assume that both parties solve simultaneously an optimization problem and agree on the risk technology at the signature of the contract, and no one deviates from the optimal, post-guarantee.
The strategy for both contracting parties is to agree on the project risk level. We presume the equilibrium to be Pareto optimal and later in the analysis we will discuss the property of this equilibrium. The mutual decision is as if there were a social planner who chooses the project's optimal risk level to maximize the sum of the profits from both parties. The optimization program is as follows:
The expression for EN is given by Equation (8) and the one for E W0 by Equation (10).
The first order condition from this optimization problem is
At equilibrium, the marginal gains for the two parties with respect to the project risk level σ V are equal. If there is an interior solution to this optimization problem, it is Pareto optimal, i.e., at optimum, one party cannot improve its net wealth without deteriorating the one of the other. Once again, since it is impossible to obtain analytical solution for the first order condition. To show the existence of an interior solution, we proceed by numerical computations. We plot first in Figure 4 variations of
as a function of σ V .
Insert Figure 4 here
As shown in Figure 4 , all values we obtain for
are negative. The guarantor net-wealth is a decreasing function of the firm's risk level. Indeed, a high risk level for the project increases the firm default probability. If the firm defaults, the guarantor has to cover the shortfall, which reduces the guarantor's net-wealth.
In Rather than adjusting its own risk level to contain its potential losses and its default probability, the guarantor will propose a guarantee contract with a binding choice of risk level to the firm-client.
Merton and Bodie (1992) discuss three options for the guarantor to control its risk exposure and potential losses: close monitoring, rigid restriction with timely seizure of assets, and risk-based premiums. We assume that the guarantor takes part in the choice of the firm's risk level. Therefore, at the signature of the guarantee contract, the firm and the guarantor agree on the level of risk to be taken by the guaranteed firm. This is consistent with the monitoring prescription. The guarantor will decide to provide the guarantee only if the firm's risk-taking decision are compatible with its objectives. Insert Table 4 here
For all cases considered in Table 4 , the equilibrium risk level (σ VE ) is lower than the firm's unilaterally picked risk level (σ V * ). When it is possible to impose a selfmonitoring contract, the firm will choose a lower risk level for the project than the one it would have chosen if no monitoring strategy were in place. bigger wealth, the guarantor will be apt to back-up a high-risk project. These results are robust to the sign of δ (i.e., our channel through which the guarantor's risk affects the risk premium on the guaranteed debt).
Most studies on financial guarantees find that the correlation between the firm and the guarantor affects significantly the guarantee premium, e.g., Lai (1992), Soumaré (2002), Chang, Lai, and Yu (2002) . Pursuing a different objective, we study the impact of this correlation on equilibrium risks. As shown in Figure 5b , the impact of the correlation between the firm and the guarantor on the equilibrium project risk depends also on the maturity of the guaranteed debt. When the debt maturity is short or medium (less than 8 years in our numerical case), the equilibrium risk is increasing with the correlation levels. For longer maturity debts, increasing the correlation level decreases the equilibrium risk level. These results are robust to the sign of the correlation.
Insert Figure 5 here
The equilibrium risk increases with the required investment cost (see Figure 6a) . If the investment is costly, the firm and the guarantor will benefit from agreeing on a high risk level. Figure 6b plots the equilibrium risk for different values of the portion of the investment financed by the firm's internal funds, α, i.e., the ownership ratio of the project sponsor. The impact on σ VE depends also on the maturity of the guaranteed debt. For shorter maturity debt, both parties gain by consenting on a high risk project when shareholders contribution is high. For longer maturity debts, it is rather optimal to agree on a low risk project when the firm's shareholders have a big equity stake in the new project. As for the case of α, Figure 6c shows two regimes in the trend of the equilibrium risk level with respect to the initial firm value (V 0 ). When the maturity of the debt is short (less than 2 years), the relationship between the equilibrium risk and the firm's initial value is positive. Specifically, an increase in the initial value of the firm increases the equilibrium risk level, all else being equal. We obtain opposite results for longer maturity debts (more than 2 years).
Insert Figure 6 here
Further results, which we do not exhibit in this paper for the sake of brevity, show that the equilibrium project risk decreases with the initial value of the guarantor and increases with its debt level. The guarantor is less keen to increase the default risk when it has at stake a high net-wealth. Similarly, increasing the debt level of the guarantor decreases its equity stake, thereby, to profit from the asymmetry property of equity, the guarantor is better off with a high risk level for the project. And that, because a high risk level for the firm's project increases the guarantor's own risk.
To sum up, the results presented in this section show how the characteristics of both the firm and the guarantor affect the choice of the equilibrium risk level. All the results obtained are robust to changes in the baseline parameters values.
5.
Capital structure versus optimal risk: Simultaneous choice of α and σ V Due to both legislative and competitive market requirements for minimum economic (or risk) capital, the firm with the new project cannot, in general, finance entirely all its investment by debt. In the previous sections, our goal was to determine the borrowing firm's optimal risk level. The firm's capital structure, which we proxy by the debt ratio, was exogenously set. 17 In this section, we study how the firm chooses its capital structure in conjunction with its optimal risk level.
We use our framework to analyze the impact of the capital structure on the netwealth of the firm. Figure 7 plots, for different levels of the project risk, the trends of the net-wealth to firm's equity holders as a function of their investment portion in the new project. It is clear that the net-wealth to firm's shareholders varies with the portion α. The impact of α on the firm's net-wealth depends on the level of risk of the financed project.
We have two regimes for the impact of α: a decreasing regime for higher risk levels and an increasing regime for low risk levels. If the project is risky, the firm's shareholders are less inclined to finance it by a larger chunk of internal funds. To transfer part of the risk to a third party, the firm tries to finance the project by guaranteed debt. For less risky projects, the firm's shareholders net-wealth increases with the portion α financed by internal funds. The firm has then incentive to take less debt and to use more internal capital. However, in this case, the absolute level of net-wealth is lower than the one in the high risk case.
Insert Figure 7 here
We assume now that the firm fixes a target debt ratio and tries to secure the credit enhancement and rating corresponding to this desired capital structure. By imposing a constant target debt ratio, we determine simultaneously the level of α (portion of the investment financed by internal funds) and the risk level of the project. 18 From the value of the guaranteed debt B g0 derived previously (see Equation (12)), we compute the ex-17 Studies on the relationship between the capital structure and the firm's value are pioneered by Modigliani and Miller (1958) . They argue that the capital structure has no impact on the firm's total value (albeit their result is obtained under very restrictive assumptions). Later works in the vast literature on capital structure has refuted these early results and have demonstrated that the capital structure chosen by the firm has an impact on its value, e.g., Heinkel (1982) , Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) , Leland and Pyle (1977) , Turnbull (1979) among others.
18 There are other ways for the firm to choose its capital structure. One way is to conform to the legislated or the market and industry norms. The firm has to settle with a level of α to meet the benchmark, or the one from its peers economic capital requirement. Another possible way is to choose α to yield the optimal debt capacity. The debt capacity is the maximum amount of debt that funds creditors are willing to lend to the firm.
post debt ratio (after the investment is made) as follows:
. RD is a function of α and σ V , i.e., RD=f(α, σ V ). For a given level of RD, we obtain an implicit function for σ V with arguments α and RD, i.e., σ V =h(α, RD).
To examine the impact of the firm's capital structure on its risk level, we perform numerical experiments by changing simultaneously α, I and V 0 while keeping RD constant. We repeat the same experiment for different levels of RD. Table 5 below presents the results.
Insert Table 5 here
From the results in Table 5 , an increase in the debt ratio increases the optimal risk chosen by the firm. Indeed, when the amount of debt is huge, it is enticing to the firm to take more risk. With a large debt amount, most of the risk taken by the firm is borne by the guarantor. Thus taking more risk increases the firm's shareholders value, but exposes the guarantor to more default risk. On the contrary, if the debt ratio is lower, the firm's shareholders have more equity at stake in the new project and they have less incentive to take risk. This is the standard moral hazard phenomenon. However, since we are dealing with guaranteed debt, the conflict of interest is between the guarantee provider and the firm's shareholders rather than between the debt holders and the firm's shareholders.
Absent of monitoring by the guarantor, financial guarantees worsen the moral hazard problem. Furthermore, when it is heavily indebted, the firm takes even more risk and the guarantor bears these additional risks.
Any combination of α (percent of internal funds) and V 0 (firm's initial value) which yields the same debt ratio has no impact on the project optimal risk level. Hence, it is fair to argue that the optimal risk level of the firm is entirely determined by its ex-post capital structure, i.e., the post-investment capital structure. Therefore, any change in the firm's characteristics which does not alter its debt ratio will not affect the optimal risk level. To maximize the net-wealth of its shareholders, the firm will shift risk, as much as it can, to the guarantee provider. These results are consistent with the findings of Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) and Duan, Moreau, and Sealey (1992) among others, in their studies of the trade-off between capital structure and risk-taking incentives of insured depository institutions.
We plot in Figure 8 , for given levels of realized debt ratio RD (vertical lines), the isocurves of the trade-off between the portion of internal funds (α) and the risk level of the firm (σ V ). We also draw the firm's optimal risk (σ V * ) line as a function of α (horizontal line). For a given debt ratio RD, the intersections between the isocurves of (α, σ V ) combinations (vertical lines) and the horizontal line gives the optimal risk levels of the project (σ V * ) for selected portions of internal funds (α). As expected, the graph shows clearly that the optimal risk (σ V * ) is decreasing with the percentage of internal funds (α) used to finance the project. Results along the same line can be obtained with the equilibrium risk level σ VE .
Insert Figure 8 here

Conclusion
In this paper, to determine the optimal risk choices by the firm with a private guarantee on its debt, we follow two approaches. The first approach is based on a simple optimization by the firm taking into account the sole interest of the firm's shareholders.
In this case, the optimal risk level is entirely driven by the ex-post capital structure of the firm (after the project has been financed). Given that the firm chooses its risk level to maximize its shareholders' value, if it finances a new project with less internal funds, thereby, relying heavily on guaranteed debt, it has a strong incentive to take risk.
Otherwise, the firm takes less risk. The guarantor's choice of risk level depends, not only on its own leverage, but also on the risk posture of the guaranteed firm. Due to the presence of the guarantee, the firm shifts some of its risk to the guarantor. Since, in this first approach, we assume that the guarantor cannot interfere with the risk-taking behavior of the firm, if the firm increases its risk level, to reduce the overall default probability, the guarantor has to decrease its own risk.
In the second approach, we assume that the guarantor is able to affect the risk level of the firm by way of a direct or indirect monitoring policy. The idea is to contract on the borrowing firm's risk level, and after the guarantee contract is signed, no one deviates from the optimal contract. In this spirit, the contract is Pareto optimal. We find that the equilibrium level of risk taken by the firm is lower than the one when the firm decides unilaterally.
The last part of the paper deals with the simultaneous determination of the firm's capital structure and risk level. We show that the project's optimal risk level is decreasing with the portion of internal funds used to finance the project.
Even though we were able to investigate characteristics of the risk-taking behavior of the borrowing firm in the context of financial guarantees, there are issues and limitations to be explored in the future. Some of the limitations are the specifications for the risk premium and the "charter value". We do not include the guarantee premium paid by the firm per se in various payoffs. However, adding these refined features would not change qualitatively the results of the paper. For simplicity, we use a linear formulation for the risk premium and the "charter value", future works could use more complex functions. The model could also be extended to allow for issuing new shares which introduces another type of agency conflict between existing and new shareholders. Last but not the least, one can relax the assumption that managers and shareholders interests are perfectly aligned, thereby, introducing another layer of conflict of interest in the setup.
A1. Payoffs to the firm
where g is the probability density function of the standard lognormal distribution: . To obtain the first term, we need to make the change of variable in the first integral as follows:
. After some algebraic transformations, we obtain:
with ( ) 
where L(V,W) is the joint probability density function of the bivariate lognormal distribution: We can rewrite
Assuming the joint distribution of two lognormal distributions to be a bivariate lognormal distribution, we use the approach proposed by Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1984) to compute the different integrals.
Let's consider the following change of variables: 
Finally, applying the same method, we compute the other terms for E W0 in Equation ( 
Let's consider the following identities:
where N 2 is the cumulative function of the standard bivariate normal distribution with correlation coefficient ρ. Using these identities and after some algebraic manipulations, we obtain: (   10  5  2  5  1  2   9  8  2  8  1  0  7  3  2  3  1  0  1   6  5  2  6  1  5  1  2   4  3  2  4  1  3 
We proceed in similar fashion to obtain the quasi-closed form for the value of the guaranteed debt.
A3. Differentiation of the payoffs (first order conditions)
We use the Leibnitz differentiation rule for integral functions:
φ is an integral function, then its differential with respect to x is given as follows: . It is easily shown that
A3.1 Differential of EN with respect to
, and 
A3.2 Differentiation of E W0 with respect to
Using the Leibnitz formula for double integrals, we obtain the following relationships below. Using this expression, we compute the following differentials: 
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